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Ransomware attacks have become part of the normal vernacular, as more 
organizations get attacked and must deal with the outcome in the media. School 
districts are in a unique position because of COVID and the sudden shift to online 
or hybrid learning. Over the past few years, ransomware attacks on K12 school 
districts have been widely reported in the news, leading to questions on whether 
K12 school districts are more vulnerable to these attacks. This project focused 
on: the prevalence of ransomware attacks in  K12 School Districts in the USA in 
general and in the Inland Empire in particular, examining what  value attackers 
gain by attacking a school district as well as looking at the costs incurred to the 
district because of an attack,  whether  K12 School districts in the Inland Empire 
are following cybersecurity best practices to protect in case of a ransomware 
attack. The findings are:   that school districts are at a higher risk of ransomware 
attacks because they are soft targets with understaffed under budgeted IT 
departments, school districts do not pay ransoms and are left with the higher cost 
or remediation, there is a lack of security focus in the job descriptions for IT 
managers working in K12 in the Inland Empire, temporary school shutdowns due 
to ransomware are shown to negatively affect the GDP in the long term.  The 
recommendations are: school districts should  use COVID relief funds to 
hire/contract a CISO and figure out a way to keep the position funded into the 
future, school districts in the Inland Empire should hire more IT staff and focus on 
security awareness training for its users including students, schools should move 
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away from passwords and replace it with 2FA using badge and pins. For future 
study the issues of long term funding for CISO positions and the creation of 
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INTRODUCTION TO RANSOMWARE 
What is Ransomware? 
Ransomware is designed to encrypt a user’s data and then ask for money 
in return for a key to unlock the data. The process has become much more 
sophisticated than this with automated processes that handle the infection, 
encryption of files, generation of a ransom file, and handling of encryption keys 
(O'Kane, 2018). Ransomware can infect any device or operating system. It can 
also encrypt an entire system or hard drive, causing it to become non-operational 
(Liska, 2017).  
The first ransomware ever created was called AIDS, and it was developed 
by Dr. Joseph Popp in 1989 (Ipsen, 2021). It is uncertain as to why he created 
the ransomware, since he was later prosecuted for distributing AIDS but found 
unfit for trial by reason of insanity (Ipsen, 2021). Popp chose to distribute the 
ransomware via floppy at a World Health Organization AIDS conference (Ipsen, 
2021). Users would load the floppy disk into their computers and, when 
launched, it would replace an AUTOEXEC.EXE file and wait for the system to be 
rebooted 90 times (Ipsen, 2021). On the 90th startup, it would encrypt the file 
names using symmetrical key encryption (Ipsen, 2021). The ransom demanded 
was $189, which needed to be sent to the PC Cyborg Corporation PO BOX in 
Panama (Ipsen, 2021). A group of researchers later developed a decryption 
utility called AIDSOUT that would decrypt the files. 
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Cryptocurrency, as ransomware payment, also gave rise to the popularity 
of being able to set up a payment network without having a way for it to be traced 
back to the hacker. Bitcoin specifically accounts for up to 98% of all ransomware 
payments (JARETH, 2019). Bitcoin's original purpose, as described by the 
organization’s website, is to create a consensus payment network that is 
completely digital, decentralized, peer-to-peer, and powered by the users with no 
middlemen (Frequently Asked Questions, 2021). This decentralized nature 
allows hackers to request and accept payment with Bitcoin and not have to worry 
about being tracked. Hackers also use services like mycryptomixer.com as a 
crypto tumbler that further anonymizes the hacker from the ransomware payment 
so they can convert and spend it using a fiat currency (Bitcoin Mixer, 2021). 
Modern ransomware operates with the business model of creating a 
problem and a potential solution (as some ransoms are paid and no key is 
provided). Hackers are interested in getting paid for the decryption key. This 
creates an incentive for them to provide the decryption key, since not providing it 
will decrease the confidence that people have in these hackers. If hackers create 
a reputation for not sending a decryption key, then there will be a decrease in 
individuals who are willing to pay due to a lack of confidence (Michael Schwirtz, 
2021).  
Ransomware operators must provide some level of customer service to 
those they infect. An example of this customer service is when a woman who, 
using her encrypted laptop, encountered difficulty in purchasing Bitcoins needed 
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to pay the ransom. She was able to communicate with the hackers who let her 
get away with underpaying the $500 ransom and still provide the decryption 
program (Studios, 2015). The majority of people have still never bought or used 
any crypto currency, and it can be a steep learning curve if your first transaction 
is for the purposes of paying a ransom (NASDAQ, 2021). 
It is estimated that $20 billion in ransomware payments will be made in 
2021 (Morgan, 2021). The first iterations of the ransomware Wannacry used an 
unpatched exploit in the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol to scan and 
replicate itself over ports 139 and 445 (APPENDIX C). After infecting a system, it 
would install a backdoor tool called DoublePulsar that allowed persistent access 
(Martin Lee, 2017). Next, it would scan the internal network and any external 
networks that it had access to. With each file that it encrypted, it would generate 
an executable that would pop up with instructions on how to buy Bitcoins and 
where to send them in return for the decryption program. Patching the SMB bug 
was the only way to avoid infection.  
The future for ransomware will be to follow the general trend in IT, which is 
to move to the cloud. The target for ransomware has been local systems that are 
not properly backed up (Galov, 2021). Continuing the trend of businesses moving 
to the cloud, a new breed of ransomware will be developed to target cloud hosted 
services. Individual businesses using the cloud can limit the damage done by 
ransomware in the cloud by developing apps that are cloud host agnostic. This 
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allows moving to another hosting provider with minimal effort. Data should also 
be backed up and follow the 3 versions in 3 locations on 2 mediums strategy. 
How Ransomware Affects K12 School Districts Information System 
Ransomware directly affects schools by encrypting files or drives  and not 
allowing any staff or students access to those files. Ransomware averages 
around 3 seconds to begin encrypting files on a computer once it infects the 
machine (Arctic Wolf Networks, Inc., 2016). With this speed of infection, leaving a 
computer turned on overnight would cause it to have all its files encrypted by 
morning. Some security advisors advocate for turning off your computer at night 
to slow and stop the spread of a ransomware attack (Panda Security, 2020). 
Leaving a computer turned off at night might slow down the infection rate 
on a local machine. The reality is that it would not likely make a dramatic 
difference since most files are stored on a Network Attached Storage device 
(NAS) that contains the files of hundreds of potentially individuals. Storing files on 
a NAS is one way to store and more easily backup users’ files. Another 
advantage of storing users files on a NAS is that it allows the user to access their 
files from multiple computers since they only need to connect to the network to 
retrieve their files. This is preferable to storing and backing up files on a local 
machine. Instead of having to install and manage a backup for every machine 
that a user might use, they can instead configure backups of the NAS and thus 
be able to back up hundreds of users’ files at once.  
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The policy on Windows environments that allows access to users files 
from multiple computers is called folder redirection. It is configured through a 
domain controller’s group policy (Deploy Folder Redirection with Offline Files, 
2021). When setting up folder redirection of the users’ documents to a Windows 
File Server, it is important that the correct permissions are set for users. If set up 
correctly then only the user will have access to the files in the redirected folder on 
the file server. An administrator can access these folders at any time from the file 
server as a domain administrator, but they run the risk of changing the folder’s 
permission and allowing more access to the files than needed if the policy is not 
correctly set up (Microsoft, 2008).  
If the files are only accessible by the directory user, then in the case of a 
ransomware attack only the files they have access to can be encrypted. For this 
reason, it is important that folder redirection be configured with limited rights that 
allow only the logged in user access. Incorrectly setting folder permissions can 
lead to the ransomware encrypting more files than it would have originally. This 
can escalate to the entire file server getting encrypted if the account that is 
compromised has administrative rights and access to all the files. An 
administrative account may have access to the file servers and to other 
infrastructure servers providing services like DHCP, DNS, Active Directory, and 
vendor specific servers.  
When ransomware targets Active Directory, it has access to all the 
information required for users to authenticate across the network. One example 
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where this type of attack took place is Norsk Hydro. One employee unknowingly 
opened a malicious email on a trusted computer three months prior to the 
ransomware demand (Briggs, 2019). From the time the email was opened to 
when the attack took place, the hackers planned and used Active Directory to 
push out the attack using the domain controller (Briggs, 2019). Since the domain 
controller has an administrative trust relationship with all machines and users on 
the domain, its spread is almost unstoppable once infected. 
Many school districts rely on services like folder redirection and active 
directory. If the servers hosting these services become infected with 
ransomware, it would render users unable to use Active Directory for user 
authentication or to load their files with folder redirection. This would also cause a 
cascading effect on other services that use Active Directory for account creation 
and synchronization, like Google Cloud Directory Sync and Google Password 
Sync. The Google services may continue to run, but without Active Directory new 
accounts and password changes would require manual updates. It should be 
noted that some schools that use Chromebooks for all students and staff are so 
far safe from ransomware attacks. Some school districts that are shutdown from 
ransomware will often continue to be able to use their Chromebooks (OXENDEN, 
2020). 
Problem Statement 
 This project investigates whether K12 school districts in the USA in 
general and in the Inland Empire in particular are more likely to experience a 
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ransomware attack when compared to government institutions or businesses. 
The focus is on the following questions: 
● Is there data to suggest ransomware attacks are targeting school districts 
in the USA? 
● Are K12 school districts in the Inland Empire following best practices to 
avoid ransomware attacks? 
● What are the cost implications to ransomware attacks on a cost and loss 
of instructional time for students? 
Information was collected to compare the amount of ransomware attacks that 
have affected K12 school districts for the 2020 - 2021 school year (see 
APPENDIX D). This was  compared to information available from other 
government agencies and businesses. Comparing the attack rates should allow 
for a conclusion to be drawn on whether ransomware is targeting K12 school 
districts, fall in line, or are less when compared to other government agencies or 
businesses in the USA and specifically in the Inland Empire (San Bernardino and 
Riverside Counties).. 
 Focus was  on how K12 school districts configured their information 
systems and how they structured and trained their employees to be cybersecurity 
aware and guard against cyber attacks. Checking to see if there are training 
manuals or training provided that details how internal employees should deal with 
possible ransomware attacks will show if they are prepared for a possible attack. 
8 
 
District websites were checked to see if they linked to internal resources that 
could be targeted. 
Next, an analysis was conducted on the information services departments 
at K12 school districts to identify best practices that will aid in avoiding 
ransomware infections. Emphasis was placed on prevention methods that are 
specific to K12 school districts. Examples of how some Inland Empire K12 school 
district information technology departments structure their systems will be given 
and suggestions made on how to best secure them from being infected with 
ransomware. 
It was also important to look at what the cost was for a district that 
experienced a ransomware attack. We will look at available articles that detail 
any additional costs that were incurred because of a ransomware attack. School 
districts also include contract items in the monthly or weekly board meetings. 
This necessitates examining board meeting minutes and agendas to see if there 
are cost items associated with services purchased that could be related to 
ransomware mitigation or remediation. 
I also relied on my 7 years of IT experience having worked at four school 
districts in the Inland Empire and High Desert communities. My roles included 
classified titles like Computer Technician and Systems Application Specialist, to 
the most current management position of Data Warehouse Administrator. 
This project was organized as follows: Chapter 2 evaluated K-12 
Information Systems, Chapter 3 examines the risk of ransomware in K-12 school 
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 EVALUATING K12 INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
How K12 Information Systems are Setup 
All school districts’ information services are set up in very similar ways due 
to lucrative discounts from Microsoft (CITE, 2021) and Google Workspace 
(Google, 2021). They have a student information system (SIS) that is provided by 
a third party. School staff enter data to the SIS for student/staff demographics, 
generating schedules, program information, etc. Staff and student directory 
accounts exist for accessing various internal or external systems. There is a 
private network that connects all of these systems together and provides access 
to the internet. There are local and state reporting agencies that track staff and 
student data within the system. Between all these systems is the flow of data that 
is generated by everyone using the system to track student items including 
progress, behavior, and academic milestones. 
The SIS is the heart of the school district’s data. It contains the following 
information: student demographics, staff assignments, class schedules, student 
behavior data, special program data, and much more. Data entry into the SIS 
occurs on a constant basis throughout the year and most of the certificated staff 
are the ones primarily doing the data entry. Certificated staff use the data to 





Figure 1 Student System Components (Lopez, 2021). 
 
User Accounts are created from the SIS or through a combination of 
another system and the SIS. Human resources may have additional systems 
where staff information is first entered during a pre-hire stage. Through the use of 
one of these systems staff and student accounts are created. Identity 
management in the education space is dominated by Microsoft Active Directory 
and Google Workspace for education (Cavanagh, 2017). Other alternatives such 
as Clever or One Roster exist, but those usually receive data from the SIS or 
Active Directory or Google Workspace. 
Single Sign On (SSO) has been popularized because of Google 
Workspace, Microsoft Azure AD, Classlink, and Clever across many learning 
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platforms online. Using the credentials from one identity provider allows users to 
not have to memorize multiple logins for different websites. Properly 
implemented SSO has had the overall effect of making the identity logins of a 
user more secure because the user is able to create one stronger password 
rather than having to use different ones across multiple identities. (Sciarretta, 
2017). Not all applications can be converted to use SSO, but it is one of the 
biggest factors when purchasing new online curriculum programs because users 
do not need to learn a new login method (Gellert, 2017). 
The network for a K12 school district can vary widely due to geographical 
constraints. Most school districts in California are connected via private fiber and 
are interconnected through the K12 High Speed Network (California K-12 High 
Speed Network, 2021). Districts such as the Ontario-Montclair School District 
inner connect their school networks through redundant fiber links between school 
sites (District, 2017). One forced change due to COVID-19 for some school 
districts that were still in the planning stages is the reliance on laptops for 
teachers and students.  
Depending on the resource used by students, the need for them to 
connect into the district network may not exist. Any internal resources like file 
servers or applications would require a VPN or remote-control connection to an 
internal system. Another alternative would be to replace or migrate internal 
services to the cloud. Software as a Service (SaaS) has become a way to move 
some of the burden from inside the datacenter to the application vendor's cloud 
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infrastructure. Moving systems to the cloud requires planning for downtime and 
data migration, this would all have to be expedited to allow for the rapid change 
to distance learning. 
Staff and Student Involvement in the Information System 
 Systems within a K12 school district get used by school staff, students, 
and even parents. Pre-COVID-19 students would typically only interact with the 
computer systems while physically present in the school classroom. Post-
COVID-19 it is likely that the students will engage in a model where the device 
travels with the student back home. This is a newer model for student devices 
(Herold, 2020). District devices for staff have traditionally traveled back and forth 
if they were mobile devices.  
 More mobile devices used mobily means there is a higher chance of 
devices  getting misplaced or stolen when compared to a stationary desktop. If a 
mobile device ends up in the wrong hands, then it can be used as an infection 
tool for a malicious actor. A more likely scenario though, is that the device will 
connect to a less secure home network that does not have as much security as a 
school district network. Studies show that a home network is up to 3.5 times 
more likely to contain at least one device with malware (DAHLBERG, 2020). With 
the amount of device movement from the home into the school district, there is a 
higher risk of infection from outside the network than from within. 
 Students who may be less technologically literate, or more willing to click 
on untrustworthy websites when searching, may encounter ransomware more 
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than staff. Younger children when given access to technology they may not have 
had before are likely to search for pornography. A study that researched if top 
porn sites had more malware than other websites concluded that they did in fact 
have higher rates of hosted malware (Top porn sites lead to malware, 2013). 
Malware on these top porn sites would linger in the advertisements that were 




Figure 2 Porn Consumption Under 18 (Warner, 2017) 
 
K12 Information System Policies. 
 End user training to reduce ransomware infections has become more 
common in the K12 education sector thanks to E-Rate funding from the 
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government. For the 2021 school year, E-Rate funding set a spending cap of 
$4.276 billion dollars(Consumer and Governmental Affairs, 2021). In a survey 
studying the cost of cybersecurity across 65 school districts, it was found that all 
had some form of end user training(Networking, 2018). This compares to 95% of 
executives at businesses, law enforcement services and government agencies 
who stated their employees receive security awareness training at least once per 
year (Liu, 2018). The rigor of the training included active end-user phishing 
awareness with simulated phishing attacks and cybersecurity awareness training. 
This training was however mostly optional since there is limited time for staff to 
participate because they are also expected to participate in other mandatory 
training. In the three school districts where I have worked the last five years, all 
incorporated some form of training to detect phishing attacks over the web and 
email.  
 Password policies are difficult to implement because users are affected by 
the already growing list of passwords that they must remember. NIST security 
standards suggest the following (NIST, 2017): 
● A password must be changed at least every 60 days. 
● Prevent users from selecting previously used passwords. 
● Check passwords against a list of weak passwords. 
● Set complexity requirements that specify the minimum number of 
characters and that a mix of character types be used. 
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These password recommendations typically result in backlash from users 
because it is a task that often stops them from doing their job and requires 
additional work from them.  
 Physical security is sometimes overlooked since it may be the last thing 
that management would expect to be compromised. Limiting access to 
infrastructure like servers in a datacenter by having specific keys for the entrance 
door or using a RFID scanner to allow access should be a base-level of physical 
security for the infrastructure. This would discourage normal day to day 
employees from entering the room and require that visitors contact someone with 
the appropriate access to validate their need for temporary access.  
 Other physical security would be encouraging staff to lock their computers 
when walking away from their desk. Pairing this information with a screensaver 
policy that requires a password to unlock the computer is recommended by the 
NIST, PCI DSS, an ISO 27001 (DeMeyer, 2019). Having no lockout policy means 
that anyone walking by can have access to your system and can browse with the 
logged in users’ permissions. This policy would stop from leaving a system open 
if a simple break turns into a weekend of unlocked computer access for anyone 
to use. 
 Password sharing has been a solution for teachers and staff to give 
access to a substitute while they are out. For Example, teachers would share 
their password on a sticky note or let the front office know what the password 
was when they were out (Amy, 2015). There are many documented cases of 
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students obtaining the teacher’s password due to leaving it on a sticky note and 
performing activities such as changing their grades (LEAL, 2009). This method to 
provide access to substitutes has been curbed by the fact that SSO would give 
the substitute access to the teachers email and other systems. 
Data Flow In and Out 
 School districts rely on third party online or digital curriculum vendors to 
aid teachers in educating students. Online curriculum vendors need tsystem 
access to create accounts for students and staff. Sending .txt, .csv, or excel files 
to an FTP or SFTP server has been a standard option for many years. It allows 
for data export from the SIS, organizes it into a file, and sends it over in an 
automated way. This process can become unmanageable since more digital 
curriculums lead to more data uploads that require more management. The 
growing trend has been to use a SSO provider like Clever or Class link to simplify 
adding new curriculum vendors. 
 They centralize sharing data to third party curriculum vendors through 
rules that are setup on their web portal. To do this they require a district to send a 
complete roster of all their students, staff, schools, classes, and teachers to 
Clever nightly. This data is integrated and from there you can select from the 
approved list of third party integrations to quickly share this roistering information 
and set an approved set of students.  
 School districts are also incrementally moving to the cloud to ease on 
management and cost of upgrades to existing infrastructure. From 2014 to 2016, 
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400 school districts surveyed moved from providing 42% of their IT solutions fully 
or partially in the cloud to 74% (CDW, 2016). The service that migrated from 
hosted to the cloud the most was email which moved from 64% to 88% fully 
hosted during that period. Other services which have seen partial migration to the 
cloud include SQL due to the ability to provide redundancy, scalability, and 
backup. Licensing costs for Microsoft SQL are often more expensive than the 
initial cost of moving it to the cloud. This along with not wanting to fully commit to 
hosting critical infrastructure services in the cloud is a reason why many schools 
choose to keep copies of their data in the cloud (Bertram, 2016). 
Cloud hosted email platforms like Office 365 and Google Workspace 
contain much of the data that an organization creates daily. Email and file 
storage are two areas where these platforms get used by all users in the district. 
Some of the data that is shared to county and state agencies is student medical 
data. 
 Medical data is collected for students on an ongoing basis. This 
information can include events such as visits to the nurse’s office due to run-of-
the-mill illness or minor injuries. Other patient data contains more sensitive 
medical history that can include a student’s mental health. There are many ways 
the data can be harvested for a ransom that would greatly damage the district 
due to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) or other 
financial violations if it were to be released(American Medical Association, 2021). 
This is one of the items that hackers use to bargain with the compromised school 
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districts if they resist paying the ransom. While the information may have limited 
value to the hackers, it can expose the school district to a high amount of 





THE RISK OF RANSOMWARE IN K12 SCHOOLS 
 
Schools may not have instruction available year-round, but that does not 
mean that the schools remain empty, and that technology is not in use year-
round. Office staff remain at different sites working and are still targeted by 
ransomware. School districts remain a large and lucrative target according to the 
security firm Bit Sight  (Floeell, 2017). It is estimated that 13% of educational 
institutions have faced some sort of ransomware infection (Floeell, 2017). 
Assessing Vulnerability in K12 Information Systems 
The IT staff to student ratio is too large when compared to the best 
practices set forth in the private sector of 1:82 (Livy, 2018). When students are 
considered into the overall ratio, the best school district in the Inland Empire has 
an IT staff to user ratio of 1:603 (APPENDIX B). While more resources are 
available to IT staff to manage more devices from a central location like Google 
Workspace, the time needed to properly address basic user needs is not there. 
High IT staff to user ratios show that there is an over reliance on management 
tools to attempt to meet the security needs of a district. Understaffing to this 






Figure 3 Vulnerability Targets 
 
It is difficult to attract and maintain the most highly skilled cybersecurity 
staff that you would rely on to lead cybersecurity initiatives since compensation is 
better in the private sector (Cole, 2020). Having a high amount of staff turnover 
because your best cybersecurity staff is constantly rotating out leads to a 
patchwork of security policies that get implemented, but not updated and 
maintained ( Johnson, 2018). There are other solutions that can be implemented 
if there is a lack of funds to hire full time cybersecurity staff. These solutions are  
discussed later in the conclusion..  
Laptops require the use of wireless internet to connect to the network. 
This is provided by home or district Wi-Fi, or with 4g hotspots provided by the 
school district. Devices that were once connected to only the school networks 
and had their traffic filtered through a firewall now rely on home networks and 
mobile broadband vendors to provide a safe connection. Staff devices used to be 
the only ones moving from an outside network back to the district network, but 
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now some school districts are offering a blended learning model. This blended 
learning model allows students some in person and online instruction with their 
device (Dupree, 2021).. 
Policies for devices, firewall, anti-virus and operating systems had to be 
updated to accommodate for students and staff moving the classroom and office 
to their homes. The firewall became unable to stop threats at the perimeter 
because devices were no longer behind it. There were several ways to protect 
against the threats to the network while still allowing continuity in the classroom 
and workplace. Two of those methods were to utilize VPN connections to users 
who needed direct access from their device to the district network, and another 
was to use remote control software to allow access to other computers inside the 
network. 
Using either of these methods to allow a connection inside the district 
network meant that new or additional license cost needed to be taken into 
consideration. VPN clients and remote desktop software (RDS) can be licensed 
in different ways but being forced to scale up due to COVID meant that costs for 
IT services went up (Fortune Business Insights, 2020).. Market research shows 
that overall the annual growth rate of RDS increased 15% from 2019 to 2020. 
TeamViewer, which provides a RDS solution, had a 75% growth in the first 
quarter of 2020. Allowing connections into the network meant that the internet 
connection for the district would be utilized more since those connections no 
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longer traveled over the local LAN. Overall, IT costs increased for K12 School 
Districts during the pandemic.. 
Evaluating Entry Points for Ransomware  
Entry points for ransomware are no different from any other virus or 
malware. Hackers may be targeting a specific company or spamming as many 
possible targets as possible to see if they can get a hit. Phishing through email 
spoofing is popular with school districts once the hacker has a list of users’ 
emails available for them to target. The hacker will imitate another user or service 
to get the victim to either run or open a file attachment, or by sending them to a 
spoofed website that asks them to login.  
Phishing attacks are effective because they get the user to believe in a 
made-up scenario, such as requiring them to reset their password before it 
expires or asking them to log into a file hosting site like Microsoft OneDrive or 
Google Drive to retrieve a file sent to them. When the user logs in, then the 
hacker can use the credentials they captured to either infiltrate the network. Next, 
they use the compromised user’s access to release ransomware into the district . 
They may also use the compromised user to send out other spoofed emails to 
other users with the cover of originating from an actual user. Since hackers 
spend up to 24 days on average on the network before they infect it with 
ransomware, they can read the user’s emails and create a more specific plan to 
infect the network (Solutions, 2021). 
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While the hackers are in possession of valid user credentials, they can 
use the time they spend on the network to look for other vulnerabilities that 
present themselves. Unpatched servers or network equipment can be used to 
gain alternative access points back into the network, or to disable any systems 
that may detect and remove them. If the hackers can escalate privileges to where 
they can use system or domain accounts, they can even disable backup systems 
or modify anti-virus to whitelist their presence.   
Other infection methods include remote desktop protocol (RDP) which has 
been found to be a straightforward way to enter a computer network. This 
method is used by hackers with commonly available network scanning tools who 
scan the open internet for open ports 3389 for RDP (APPENDIX C). Once an 
open RDP port is found, the hacker can run a brute force credential attack (Hail 
Hydra RDP Brute Force, 2018) that has the credentials for up to 15 billion 
compromised accounts (Ilascu, 2020).  
RDP is a very useful protocol for gaining remote access to computer 
systems for the purpose of system administration (Microsoft, 2021). Some 
companies have used RDP on the open web as a free remote access option to 
systems from outside the network since it only requires an open port on the 
firewall. RDP can be combined with a VPN to not publicly expose the systems 
directly to the internet, or a Remote Desktop Gateway can be configured to 




VPNs have gained a lot of popularity during the pandemic partially 
because licenses were offered at heavy discounts or free trials of up to 90 days 
were given (Product Notifications, 2020). VPNs typically operate using a firewall 
or dedicated VPN server that gets configured to work through the school district’s 
firewall and allows clients to connect to the internal network. There are three 
main ways that clients can connect to the corporate VPN from their home. One 
method operates with VPN software that gets installed on the user’s device. This 
allows only the device with the software installed to connect back to the school 
district’s network. A similar option is to use the host operating system’s 
connection profiles to connect to the school district’s network. Finally, one 
method uses a dedicated firewall that has a preconfigured connection to the 
district network and allows any computer connected to it access through the 
secure tunnel. This last option allows multiple devices to connect and can even 
allow wireless devices if the hardware supports Wi-Fi. 
An incorrectly configured VPN poses a threat in many ways. An NSA 
security advisory explains how three different VPN programs provided by three 
different companies were found to be vulnerable and weaponized by active 
persistent threat actors (NSA, 2019). The VPN client from Pulse secure had a 
vulnerability where the attacker could send a specific uniform resource identifier 
(URI) that would allow arbitrary file reading on the VPN server. This was used to 
read the configuration files on the VPN proxy server. If SSL was used instead of 
TLS for securing the VPN gateway, then the ssl_webvpnsession file can be used 
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to collect the session token, IP Address, Username, and plaintext password of 
connecting users. An attack like this leads to other exploits that allowed the 
attacker to write and execute files on the VPN server (Directory traversal, 2020). 
Another popular VPN client from Palo Alto Networks had a remote code 
execution vulnerability that allowed attackers to execute remote code on a VPN 
gateway that had not been patched (Tsai, 2019). The exploit was rather simple 
and attacked the SSLMGR by sending a set of parameters for it to execute. One 
type of parameter request was found to crash the SSL Manager when sent. After 
crashing the SSL Manager, remote code could be executed to modify certain 
files. After the files were modified, the SSLMGR became a web console that 
could be used to execute code. 
One final type of VPN exploit that affected Fortinet FortiGate VPN Clients 
was a backdoor created by the developers. This backdoor was intended to allow 
for password resets when a user’s password had expired. This backdoor served 
to provide access to the password reset process and it was discovered and 
exploited by hackers (Tsai, 2019). This backdoor required no authentication if the 
magic parameter was submitted. The submission required sending a specialized 
request to the VPN gateway and granted the hacker a console shell that allowed 
them to set the password for a user. That account could then be used to log into 
the VPN client and grant network access.  
To summarize this chapter, we see that there are staffing and policy 
issues that cause K12 schools to be vulnerable to ransomware attacks. We also 
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see that there is proof that hackers are using phishing attacks on staff and that 
they are scanning for vulnerabilities in VPN and RDS software used by schools 
because of the pandemic. In the next chapter we will examine how these 





ANALYZING ATTACKS ON K12 SCHOOLS 
Ransomware Attacks on the Rise 
 According to a report from the K12 Cybersecurity Resource Center, the 
amount of ransomware attacks increased by 24% with 50 total reported incidents 
in the US in 2020 (Levin, 2021). Other reports from the CISA state that the 
ransomware incidents reported to the MS-ISAC from January to July 2020 
affected 16% of K12 schools and this number increased to 57% from August to 
September 2020. They also state that they expect these numbers to rise as 
school districts continue to rely on distance education for the remainder of the 
school year (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, 2020). 
Fiscal Impact 
The individuals and groups that run ransomware operations do it for the financial 
incentives. Hackers spread ransomware to as many systems as possible while 
others may spear phish and look for one lucrative company to attack. The end 
goal for those who spread ransomware is to get paid. To that end, K12 education 
systems are a different type of target because the amount of financial gain can 
be limited, but they are also an easier target.  
The budget of all K12 school districts in the US is around $760 billion 
(Levin, 2021).There is one school district who paid a ransom in 2020 of $50,000 
to resume opening faster vs taking longer to go through remidiation (Betts, 2020). 
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The usual ransom requested is $1 million (Levin, 2021). This cost for remediation 
is on the rise with the average cost for a business to recover from a ransomware 
attack increasing from $761,106 in 2020 to $1.85 million in 2021 (Ferranti, 2021). 
Since most school districts opt to not pay the ransom, they are left with the cost 
and time of recovering from the ransomware attacks. 
Overall in 2020 there were 50 reported ransomware attacks that took 
place in 25 states (Levin, 2021). This is a 24% increase in attacks when 
compared to 2019. The state with the most attacks during 2020 was Texas with 6 
(K-12 SIX, 2021). . There are only 8 states with no reported attacks since 2016, 
meaning that almost all states have been hit at some point. In the reports and 
news articles of the attacks, there is no mention of how the malware got onto the 
networks. School districts are not legally required to provide information on how 
the ransomware got on to their networks  (Department of Homeland Security, 
2016).  
 School closures because of a ransomware attack mean that there may be 
a loss in the budget that schools collect the following year due to a drop in 
Average Daily Attendance (ADA). ADA is the primary funding source for school 
districts in California, and maintaining a high ADA guarantees more funding 
(Weston, 2010). A decrease in ADA means that the district budget for the next 
year will be decreased. This can lead to staff being laid off and will result in less 
programs for students or an increase in student class sizes. Average time for an 
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organization to recover from a ransomware attack is one to two weeks if an 
experienced recovery team is involved (Networks, Alvaka, 2021). 
Entering data into the SIS is a daily occurrence by numerous staff. If staff 
were unable to access the SIS for any extended duration of time, it would mean 
that data normally being entered into the SIS would have to be entered in 
somewhere else temporarily until the SIS becomes available again. Another 
consideration is if the SIS were unable for several days during a normal school 
year, then it may not be possible to keep track of all the changes needed to be 
made. This can mean that school would have to temporarily be suspended until 
the SIS can be brought up again, or an alternative data entry method must be put 
in use. If a temporary data entry method is used, then overtime for data entry 
staff will likely have to be paid by districts so that the data can be entered into the 
SIS once it is brought back up online. 
There is value in the data housed in the SIS. Health data or student/staff 
personal identifiable information like birthdays, addresses, and social securities 
are often stored in the SIS. This data can be sold on the black market if the 
ransom is paid for or not (MELENDEZ, 2020). It can also cause a fine for 
violating HIPPA laws if the data were to be released.   
Resetting passwords at the beginning of the school year is a common and 
time-consuming practice. The helpdesk and ticket system are flooded with staff 
and students who cannot log in because they forgot their password over the 
summer. A ransomware attack would trigger a mass password reset scenario for 
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all staff and students. This is required to ensure that if the password database 
were compromised, that the attackers would not have access to the user’s data 
after systems come back online. The estimated cost of a password reset based 
on the effort of the help desk personnel is around $70 per reset for larger 
organizations (Frost, 2017). This cost would not include the time that staff spend 
resetting passwords and teaching students their new passwords. 
Providing staff with security awareness training with the goals of risk 
reduction of reinfection can cost a considerable amount of money depending on 
the quality and scope of training. Some estimates for this type of training, which 
included phishing attacks on all employees, range from $21,600 for 200 staff 
(The Return On Investment (ROI) of Security Awareness Training, 2019) to an 
average of $290K for companies  with 1,000 to 5,000 employees (Seals, 2017). It 
is also estimated that employees need around 7 hours of training per year to 
maintain an up to date level of security awareness(Living Security, 2020). 
A ransomware attack may also lead to other costs that stem from a loss of 
reputation from a cyber-attack. Certain areas of the country are very competitive 
when it comes to student enrollment since parents can choose what district to 
enroll into (Kronholz, 2014). Negative media coverage and a poor response from 
the school district may also play into diminishing the reputation of certain 
districts. Staff may also experience lowered morale due to loss of files or the 
added stress and additional workload from dealing with the attack. With the 
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looming teacher shortage, it may make it more difficult for school districts to 
attract new teachers (Weiss, 2019).  
IT staff specifically may suffer from lower morale that can lower their 
productivity. This can be more severe if the notices and information given from IT 
is not taken seriously or followed by the organization’s users after a ransomware 
attack (Myers, 2021). 
 Teachers may not be the most technically savvy and may not have offline 
backups of data. This means that in a data loss situation, it is possible for a 
teacher or staff member to lose years of lesson plans or undocumented data. 
This will lead to a loss of productivity and reduction in teacher morale since many 
will likely work unpaid overtime to recreate the lost content (McLoud, 2019). 
Impact on Student Learning  
The main goal of a school is to serve its community by providing education 
to its students. Any disruption to that process causes a loss of instructional time. 
A loss of instructional time can occur if internal systems or processes that 
students rely on are affected by ransomware. Processes like student account 
creation or having to shut down a network to stop the spread of ransomware are 
examples we will explore (Ransomware Attacks on School Districts, 2020).  
To simplify student sign on for third party learning software, Single Sign on 
(SSO) has become a necessity that helps cut down on the time it takes to teach 
students to sign on to new curriculum websites. A ransomware attack would 
likely disrupt the process that synchronizes data between the SIS and the SSO 
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vendor and cause login disruptions for students. Online video conferencing is 
how class is being conducted during the COVID shutdown and a disruption in 
synchronizing student accounts would make holding class impossible. 
Closing a school and not being able to hold instruction is detrimental to the 
academic achievement of students. An estimate by the NWEA shows that there 
was up to a 50% decrease in student learning gains in math when students 
returned to school after a closure (Tarasawa, 2020). Other reports studying the 
GDP effects of low student achievement scores, showed that a population with 
higher achievement scores increased GDP for their country vs those with lower 
scores (OCED, 2010). Closing schools will likely result in a noticeable statistical 





PLANS FOR DEALING WITH MALWARE 
Conclusion 
 Based on the research I have done on examining 20 different school 
district positions, staff and student counts, and checking union contracts to see if 
there is an opportunity for professional development, we see how ransomware 
affects K12 school districts(APPENDIX B), I make the recommendations below. 
These recommendations are tailored towards school districts. 
 
Get a Chief Information Security Officer 
 School districts should bring on a Chief Information Security Officer 
(CISO) to continuously review their organizations security practices. If the school 
district is too small, then they can hire one to provide this service for several 
hours per month. Alternatively, a small district can work with other smaller 
districts to hire a full-time security manager that fulfills this role. One other option 
is to work with the county to provide this service for all or some of its school 
districts under its management. After surveying the job descriptions of 20 school 
districts in the Inland Empire, I found that only two had dedicated security 
managers and many did not include the word security in their job descriptions 
(APPENDIX 2). 
  The importance of this role is that there needs to be an emphasis on 
security throughout the district. Many schools’ districts place security as part of 
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the job description for specific elements of that job, but it does not tie together the 
security for the entire district across different IT areas. One of the roles of a CISO 
is Governance in an organization (Fruhlinger, 2021). This means making sure all 
security initiatives are working well and that management knows where their 
funding is going. Like in other public private sectors, I believe the lack of 
governance in K12 school districts is what makes them vulnerable to 
ransomware attacks (GUENTHER, 2019).  
With various IT departments focused on their own internal projects it takes 
a CISO to focus on security for the big picture. An emphasis on a patching 
schedule for various systems will also increase the overall security of the school 
district. Patching methodology depends on the person making the decision of 
when to patch. Past experiences mixed with the risk of financial loss from a patch 
causing downtime influence these decisions (Rajivan, 2020). With a dedicated 
CISO there should be more time for testing patches for critical production 
systems and this will lead to a reduction in the time it takes to patch systems. 
Patching sooner leads to better overall security (Rajivan, 2020). 
For many school districts patching a system when needed is not an issue 
because the hardware or software is end of life (EOL) and no longer supported 
(Hennick, 2020). Products that enter the EOL phase pose a security risk to their 
organization (CISA, 2020). There are several reasons why school districts 
continue to use systems that are EOL. As of last year, around 20% of a 400 
school survey stated that they were delaying upgrading from Windows 7 with no 
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solid plans to update these systems (Pennell, 2020). Windows 7 went EOL on 
January 7, 2020 and Microsoft announced that it was stopping extended support 
for Windows 7 in 2015 (Kelly, 2014). This is just one example where a CISO 
could work on a plan to move away from EOL software given enough time. 
Funding Upgrades After the Pandemic 
 While there are many downsides to COVID, one positive note for K12 
school districts is the additional funding allocated for pandemic relief. Two relief 
bills were passed by the US Department of Education. The Governor’s 
Emergency Education Relief Fund (GEER) and Elementary and Secondary 
School Emergency Relief Fund (ESSER). These funds respectively award totals 
of $4 billion (Governor’s Emergency Education Relief Fund, 2020) and $189 
billion (Elementary and Secondary School Emergency Relief Fund, 2020) in relief 
to schools in waves based on a funding formula. This money is available to 
improve cybersecurity since it will help with the transition to hybrid learning 
(Frequently Asked Questions, 2021). When the emergency relief funds are no 
longer available then cuts to other programs will likely have to be made in order 
to continue to have the CISO position. 
 Funding from these sources can be used to restructure how personnel 
and projects get funded. Money that was unavailable for funding much needed IT 
projects and personnel is now available through federal funding. Alongside hiring 
a CISO, these new funds can be used to upgrade aging systems that are at or 
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nearing EOL status. A new approach should be taken when replacing aging 
systems that incorporate higher security levels and better thought-out policies.  
 Reviewing past policies and updating them to meet a higher security 
threshold is also something that the CISO role will take charge of. It is reported 
that 54% of IT leaders lack the budget to meet the expectations of district 
management to properly manage their technology (Maylahn, 2015, p. 4). During 
the period of the survey in the report, it was also reported that budgets were 
decreasing for 14.9% of the districts surveyed (Maylahn, 2015, p. 21). An IT 
department with inadequate staffing is likely to make sub optimal policy decisions 
that favor quick implementations that do not prioritize cybersecurity. Furthermore, 
it is likely that systems that get implemented are not updated or supported 
properly since there is not enough staff (Joyce & Nocera, 2021). 
 One common vulnerability that is affected through policy is the lack of 
local computer account admin password rotation or variation. For most school 
districts a common local admin password exists that is not changed and may not 
meet updated complexity requirements. When using Microsoft’s Active Directory, 
a free local administrator password solution (LAPS) exists that can be configured 
on the domain to randomize and update the local admin passwords so they are 
unique for each computer (Microsoft security advisory, 2015). This solution has 
been around since 2015 yet many school districts have not or were slow to 
implement it (Haber, 2020). This is often because there is a lack of desire from 
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level one support staff to have to retrain on a new method to retrieve the local 
administrator password. 
 A lack of staff can lead to other issues such as not having enough time to 
audit existing system security through red and blue team hacking(DeCusatis, 
2021). A CISO can direct internal members to find and exploit holes in the 
existing systems to educate staff on what attacking and defending would look like 
to an attacker. An approach to securing existing internal systems can have a 
beneficial effect on overall security because red-blue team exercises help train 
staff in cybersecurity . 
 Other valuable information that a CISO could work to protect is the data 
agreements between a school district and its vendors. Since ransomware 
operators are known to auction off data, they benefit from the attack whether the 
ransom is paid or not (Security, 2020).  CISO can work with new and existing 
vendors to specify who owns and controls student and staff data. The data 
generated and transmitted to third party vendors is not always owned and 
controlled by the school district. Many third party vendors operate in an opt-out 
model for sharing student directory information (KIESECKER, 2020). Depending 
on who is negotiating the contract with the third party vendor, school district 
administrators can be unaware or ill prepared to ask questions about who owns 
the data and who has control over it.  
Having a contract that clearly states that the school district owns all data 
uploaded and generated to third party vendors is critical. This contract language 
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allows the school district to delete their data off third party servers any time, and 
gives the school district the most control over its data. It is important to hold third 
party vendors accountable and to have a school district CISO who knows what 
nuances may exist between the school and third party vendors in case they are 
compromised.  
Another important note with third party vendors, is asking them about the 
security of their systems to better understand who in the company has access to 
student data and if the company can be trusted with the data in the first place. 
Third party vendors can suffer from a lack of security focus when it comes to data 
and may even be a victim of their own success if they grow too fast. A third party 
vendor who sells curriculum and online learning materials was infected by 
ransomware and had parts of its staff and student data accessed by hackers 
(Paganini, 2020). A CISO could negotiate in a contract the responsibility to be 
informed when such incidents occur.  
Professional Development for students 
 Since malware attacks are going to be more common in the future 
because of their profitability, a CISO should work with educators on creating a 
student curriculum that teaches cybersecurity basics to students. Younger 
students in elementary school have specifically been identified as higher risk 
cybersecurity targets (Yan, 2021, p. 9). One specific method for education is 
direct exposure to cybersecurity situations (Yan, 2021, p. 3). By teaching 
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students through real world examples, students will develop an aptitude early on 
for identifying and mitigating cyber attacks on their personal accounts.  
Moving Away From Passwords 
 Passwords are no longer the best way to secure systems that house 
important and sensitive data. Moving to a new type of authentication method to 
increase security is an uphill battle since most users are not willing to move away 
from common passwords (Rome, 2021, p. 75). This remains true even when they 
are made aware of better more secure methods to authenticate. Employees are 
overconfident in their company’s security and do not see a need to add security 
until there is a security incident. One reason for the lack of concern from 
employees, is that they may not see the value of protecting the school districts 
data since to them the data housed is not of high importance. 
 Passwords are the weakest link in securing data because hackers are 
willing to attack specific users through phishing and attack the stored password 
databases to copy and crack offline (JOSEPH BONNEAU, 2015). The most 
difficult threat to a password is a targeted phishing attack against one user. 
These sorts of attacks can be tailored to that user and present the biggest threat. 
Senior personnel should be required to enroll in multi factor authentication to 
access email and other important systems. Furthermore, email and other 
important systems should be selected based on added security features such as 
suspicious activity checks. When Google added suspicious activity checks to 
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Gmail that required additional pieces of user data to continue functionality, it 
decreased hijacking of Gmail accounts by 99.7% (Hearn, 2013).   
School districts need to evaluate the SSO providers and internal systems 
that store passwords to ensure they are hashed and salted so that if the 
password database is copied to an offline system, it cannot be easily decrypted 
(LAKE, 2018). Having secure passwords by way of a good password policy that 
conforms to the NIST Digital identity Guidelines (NIST, 2017) ensures a higher 
grade of security with better user experience. The guidelines make the following 
recommendations to be used with multi-factor authentication (Chapple, 2019): 
● Password length should be between 8 and 64 characters. 
● Disallow new passwords which are identified in a dictionary list of 
compromised passwords. 
● Allow all asci characters and spaces. 
● Do not set composition rules. 
● Do not expire passwords too often. 
● Do not use Knowledge-based Authentication 
 
Emphasis must be placed on combining the above recommendation for 
staff with some form of non-SMS based multi factor authentication. There are 
affordable 2FA security tokens from companies like Yubico which start at around 
$50 (YubiKey 5 Nano, 2021). Alternatively, employees can also set up 2FA using 
their smartphones and an authenticator app like Microsoft Authenticator 
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(Microsoft, 2021) or Google Authenticator (Google, 2021). These solutions are all 
built in and work well with Microsoft Azure Active Directory and Google 
Workspace for Education. These directory services make up about 94% of the 
K12 market education market (Mandaro, 2020). 
Students should also use 2FA with a badge login for K-2 and badge plus 
pin for older grades 3-12. This recommendation is based on the research done 
through Clever and the guidelines that most districts follow closely(Clever.com. 
2021). Younger students benefit from a quick login into their devices and 
programs by using just the badge. There is a physical threat of using a badge, 
but it is superseded by the fact that student logins are typically written down for 
grades K-2 anyway. If an attacker gets physical access to any K-2 classroom 
then they will be able to access the login information of students’ whether badges 
are used or not. Badges persist with the threat that teachers should provide 
supervision over their classroom and not allow suspicious individuals to 
rummage through the students’ belongings. 
Older students should also use badges but add security pins to increase 
security. Since older students can be more malicious and target other students, 
the pin serves as an added security measure that can be selected by the 
individual user. Both major badge login platforms support added pins for grades 
7-12, but that can be lowered to Kinder students if desired. These pins and 
badge act like a 2FA login 
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Badge logins are offered through multiple companies like Clever and 
ClassLink and use a generated QR code to allow users to authenticate with any 
device that has a camera. This works on any Chromebook, iOS or Windows 
device to allow login into the device and into the OS. 
Ransomware will only continue to evolve since it shows no sign of slowing 
down in companies willing to pay the ransoms. School districts will continue to be 
targets unless they take their Cybersecurity and professional development 
seriously. 
A further area of study would look into ways of funding the CISO role long 
term for all school districts. That may as mentioned earlier be a shared cost 
amongst some schools or counties. Another area to study is the education of 
students to train them to recognize different types of cyber attacks. Students with 
this education would benefit society at large since it should aid in preventing 




AVERAGE DAILY ATTENDANCE COMPENSATION
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LEA = Local educational agency AVG Days in School = 181 
EDP 365 = Expenditures for Current 
Expense of Education 
AVG instruction Hours per Day = 6.24 
Average by LEA Type Amounts in Dollars 
 













Elementary $13,238,607,018.37 $1,046,712.41 $12,647.80 $69.88 $11.20 
High $6,744,321,634.42 $493,224.32 $13,673.94 $75.55 $12.11 
Unified $49,301,984,569.59 $3,683,070.96 $13,386.11 $73.96 $11.85 
Statewide $70,032,149,542.13 $5,278,011.39 $13,268.66 $73.31 $11.75 
 
 
Average days and instruction time 
 https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/tables/sass0708_035_s1s.asp 
 






























San Bernardino Y Y K12 67 51330 NA N 
Fontana Y Y K12 35 35461 NA N 
Rialto N Y K12 21 24461 1:1165 Y 
Colton N N K12 25 20550 1:822 Y 
Ontario-
Montclair N Y K-8 21 19286 1:918 Y 
Jurupa N Y K12 21 18768 1:894 N 
Riverside N Y K12 32 40083 1:1253 Y 
Moreno Valley N Y K12 26 31597 1:1215 Y 
Rim of the 
World N Y K12 4 2926 1:732 N 
Chaffey N Y  9-12 20 23854 1:1193 Y 
Alta Loma N N K-8 4 5659 1:1415 N 
Mt Baldy N N K-8  87 NA N 
Etiwanda N N K-8 11 13478 1:1225 N 
Central N N K-8 7 4219 1:603 N 
Mountain View N Y K-8 3 2625 1:875 N 
Chino N Y K12 26 27333 1:1051 Y 
Snowline N N K12 5 7355 1:1471 Y 
Hesperia N Y K12 10 24216 1:2422 Y 
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